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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MAX SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
| Priority No. 2 
Case No. 950715-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his conviction for driving under the influence, a third-degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(7) (Supp. 1996). Therefore, this 
Court has jurisdiction. 
ISSUES AND REVIEW STANDARDS 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it refused to bifurcate the 
trial? This Court reviews de novo a trial court's legal conclusions. See State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("Appellate courts have traditionally been seen as 
having the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform 
throughout the jurisdiction."). 
2. Given the evidence before the jury that defendant was swerving in traffic, 
smelled of alcohol, failed to pass field sobriety tests, and refused to take an intoxilyzer 
test, it is reasonably likely that the jury would have acquitted defendant even if the 
prior convictions had not been allowed into evidence? A conviction will not be 
reversed even if there is error unless the error is prejudicial in the sense that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a more favorable verdict 
for the defendant." State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989). 
RELEVANT PROVISION 
The relevant portion of Utah Code Ann.41-6-44(7) (Supp. 1996), the statute 
establishing defendant's liability for a third-degree felony, follows: 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol 
concentrations - Measurement of blood or breath 
alcohol — Criminal Punishment — Arrest without 
warrant — Penalties - Suspension or revocation of 
license — Penalties. 
(7)(a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of the prior violations under this 
section is a third degree felony if at least three prior 
convictions are for violations committed after April 23, 
1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
Because the DUI charge against defendant here was his fourth violation in six 
years, the State charged defendant with a third-degree felony (R. 9). Before trial, 
defendant, with the State's agreement, asked the trial court to exclude his three prior 
DUI convictions under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, and essentially bifurcate 
the proceedings (R. 147). In this way, the jury would only adjudicate the pending, or 
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fourth, charge, and the defendant would stipulate to the trial court the validity of the 
prior convictions (id.). If the jury convicted defendant of the current charge, the trial 
court would then enter judgment for the third-degree felony (R. 148). 
Asserting that the court "tried that once in another county and found that it was 
burdensome and confusing to the jury/ the trial court denied the stipulation and 
decided that all the evidence, including evidence of the three prior convictions, should 
go to the jury (R. 148). The trial court also stated that it believed subsection 41-6-
44(7) mandated presentation to the jury of evidence on all the elements of the crime, 
including the prior convictions (R. 148-49). 
The State mentioned the stipulation in its opening statement (R. 170, 350-51). 
The jury convicted defendant of the charge (R. 352). Though the court sentenced 
defendant to a third-degree felony, it stayed imprisonment and placed defendant on 
probation (R. 135-36). 
Factual Statement 
While driving south on State street in Springville, Utah, Ann Robinette twice 
saw defendant's white Chevy truck go all the way off the side of the road and quickly 
overcorrect, ending up one or two feet into the middle turning lane (R. 175). 
Defendant was driving at least 40 to 45 miles an hour and never slowed down either 
while pulling off the road or while correcting (R. 176). Ms. Robinette stayed behind 
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the defendant until she stopped at the Springville Police Department to report the erratic 
driving and provide a license plate number and description (R. 178). 
Officer Theron Leany responded to the dispatch call and he saw defendant 
traveling about five miles an hour in a 25 mph zone (R. 187). Eventually, defendant 
came to an intersection and stopped, even though there was no traffic light or stop sign 
causing him to do so (R. 187-88). Officer Leany saw defendant make a very wide turn 
and his passenger front tires left the roadway (R. 189). The officer then stopped the 
defendant's truck (id.). 
Though defendant responded to the officer's request to get out of the car, he did 
so very slowly, holding on to the truck while he climbed down (R. 192). Even after he 
climbed down, defendant rested against the truck rather than stand away (id.). When 
Officer Leany asked for his drivers' license, defendant said nothing but slowly pulled 
his wallet out of his back pocket (R. 193). He then took 8 to 10 seconds to open the 
wallet, which he needed to hold with both hands, and pull a business card from it (id.). 
While getting his wallet, defendant had to let go of the truck and Officer Leany noticed 
a "distinct stumble" (R. 195). Officer Leany asked again for the drivers' license (id.). 
Instead of verbally responding, defendant stared at the officer for a while, looked 
toward his business card, and pointed it in Officer Leany's direction (R. 196). 
By this time, another peace officer, Officer Gause, had also arrived and was 
standing beside Officer Leany (R. 198). Finally, defendant spoke in a slow, slurred 
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fashion and said: "Look guys, work with me. I'm on my way to my girlfriend's 
house" (id.). Officer Leany smelled alcohol on his breath (id.). Consequently, and as 
a result of defendant's other behaviors, the officers asked defendant to take a field 
sobriety test and to go over to the side of the road (id.). Defendant "stood there for 
some time and I [Officer Leany] had to repeat the question several times asking him to 
step to the side" (R. 199). When defendant finally moved to the sidewalk, Officer 
Leany assisted him because "he did not appear to be real stable on his feet" (id.). 
Defendant never complained about being ill (R. 200). 
Officer Leany asked defendant to do the one-leg stand (id.). However, 
defendant said he had a broken left ankle, even though he was not limping, did not 
wear a case or brace, and was wearing cowboy boots (id.). Nevertheless, the 
policeman told defendant he could stand on his right foot and lift his left foot so as not 
to damage the injured ankle (R. 201). Though defendant lifted his foot about six 
inches, he immediately lost balance and dropped his foot back on the ground (R. 202). 
Defendant could not follow the finger-counting test, the pen test, or horizontal 
nystagmus test (R. 202-05). Accordingly, Officers Leany and Gause placed defendant 
under arrest for driving under the influence and took him to the station (R. 207). 
There, they gave him the opportunity to take a breathalyzer test, but he refused (R. 
222). Although defendant demanded to take a blood test instead of a breath test, he 
ultimately also refused that test as well (id.). 
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Defendant denied some of the statements Ms. Robinette and Officer Leany made 
about his driving and other behavior (R. 283-90). He admitted, however, that some of 
his driving and talking may have been erratic because he had the flu that day and did 
not feel well (R. 284). Defendant also stated that he had consumed no alcohol that day 
(R. 285). Additionally, he stated that it takes approximately 12 beers for him to 
become impaired (R. 299). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Admission to the jury of previous DUI convictions. The State concedes that 
the trial court erred by presenting evidence of defendant's three previous DUI 
convictions to the jury. Governing precedent demands that a trial like this be 
bifurcated, with the jury deciding only the instant DUI charge and the trial court 
handling the enhancement. In this manner, a jury is not prejudiced by a defendant's 
prior convictions. 
Harmless error. The trial court's mistaken decision to allow evidence of the 
DUI conviction to come before the jury did not prejudice defendant. The evidence 
convicting defendant of the present DUI was so overwhelming that an acquittal would 
not have been reasonably likely even if the previous DUIs had not been mentioned. 
Therefore, the error in admitting the convictions was not harmful and does not mandate 
reversal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO 
BIFURCATE THE TRIAL. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's refusal to split the trial into two phases, a 
request with which both he and the State agreed (R. 147). The trial court rejected this 
stipulation on the grounds that it would be confusing to the jury. Regardless of the 
validity of this concern, however, bifurcation is the correct procedure. When previous 
convictions are an aggravating element in a DUI case, those convictions must be kept 
from the jury, whose sole job is to adjudicate the pending DUI charge without knowing 
about criminal history. This has been the law for more than half a century. State v. 
Stewart, 171 P.2d 383, 387 (Utah 1946). Under this two-stage format, after the jury 
has convicted a defendant of the pending charge, the jury or trial court hears evidence 
about prior convictions. If those convictions are found to have occurred within the 
necessary time frame, the sentence is enhanced. Id. 
Trials of enhanced crimes are bifurcated so that a fair trial is possible. "[B]y 
directing attention to prior offenses, a defendant may be deprived of the presumption of 
innocence, and in doubtful cases a verdict of guilty might be based on prior convictions 
instead of on the basis of proof of the particular crime for which defendant is on trial." 
Id. When prior convictions or criminal status are an element of an offense, two-stage 
proceedings are normal and constitutionally mandated. Old Chief v. United States, 117 
7 
S.Ct. 644, 655 (1997) (felon in possession of weapon); State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 
556-67 (Utah 1989) (previous conviction as element of criminal homicide); State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 498 (Utah 1988) (prior crimes as aggravating circumstances); 
State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 740-41 (Utah 1985) (severance of status issue from 
underlying burglary charge and theft charges). 
Old Chief is only the most recent case to hold that exclusion of prior conviction 
supporting an enhancement is so important as to require a bifurcated trial. Like 
defendant, Old Chief sought to stipulate to his prior conviction, thus avoiding 
prejudicing the jury. However, the prosecution objected, claiming a right to present 
the evidence in the manner it wished. The federal trial court and court of appeals 
agreed with the prosecution. The federal supreme court reversed and reiterated the 
need for a bifurcated procedure when evidence of a prior conviction or criminal status 
could harm the defendant's standing with the jury. Old Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 655 ("the 
only reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially 
outweigh the discounted probative value of the [conviction], and it was an abuse of 
discretion to admit [it] when an admission was available."). 
Similarly here, the trial court erred when it refused to accept the stipulation 
regarding prior convictions and instead allowed potentially prejudicial evidence to come 
before the jury. However, as discussed in the next point, due to the quantity and 
quality of the other evidence of impairment, the error was not, in fact, prejudicial. 
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II. DUE TO THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE 
AGAINST DEFENDANT, ADMISSION OF THE 
PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS WAS NOT HARMFUL. 
The State's concession that the trial court made the wrong call does not mean the 
conviction is wrong. In Old Chief, the Supreme Court specifically stated that it was not 
discussing the possibility of harmless error" because it had not been raised below. Old 
Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 656, n. 11. A trial court's error is harmful only "if absent the error 
there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant." State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993); accord State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 21 
(Utah App. 1994). Whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome is based upon the other evidence in the record. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 
920 (Utah 1987). Ultimately, a reviewing court reverses only if its "confidence in the 
verdict is undermined." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1224. 
Reviewing a similar trial error in admitting previous DUI convictions, the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals used the harmless error test to uphold the conviction in a 
similar case. State v. Alexander, 1996 WL 706767 (Wis. App. Dec. 10, 1996) 
(attached as Addendum). There too, defendant proffered a stipulation regarding his 
past convictions, but the trial court rejected it and allowed the State to introduce 
evidence of the convictions. The court of appeals found the trial court action incorrect, 
but determined there was "no reasonable possibility that the trial court's error ... 
contributed to [the conviction]." Id. at 2. Alexander followed a previous Wisconsin 
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case where the State introduced evidence of defendant's prior crimes. In State v. 
McAllister, 451 N.W.2d 764, 767-68 (Wis.App. 1989). There, the appellate court 
chastised the trial court for allowing the evidence, but ruled that the total "evidence was 
such that a jury, without the evidence that McAllister had [previously] been convicted 
of robbery, would have returned a verdict of guilty." Id. at 768. That evidence to 
which the McAllister court referred included eyewitness testimony of the entire 
robbery. 
Here also, the jury had significant eyewitness testimony of defendant's impaired 
driving. Ms. Robinette saw defendant veer off the road and weave twice. The police 
officers recalled defendant's erratic and dangerous driving pattern, i.e., stopping in the 
middle of the road when he had the right of way, making an excessively wide turn, and 
driving at a slow speed. They also stated that deiendant could not talk well, had a 
difficult time moving without assistance, could not successfully complete any of the 
tests, smelled of alcohol, slurred his speech when he talked, could not follow simple 
directions, and had bloodshot eyes. Based on this evidence, even absent the past 
criminal history, the jury had overwhelming evidence to support its guilty verdict. 
Therefore, this Court can have great confidence in the validity of the verdict. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS l4~ March 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
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NOTICE: FINAL PUBLICATION DECISION 
PENDING. SEE W.S.A. 809.23. 
STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
David G. ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 96-1973-CR. 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin. 
Dec. 10, 1996. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County: TIMOTHY G. DUGAN, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
FINE, J. 
*1 David G. Alexander appeals from a judgment 
entered on a jury verdict convicting him of operating 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant as a third offense, see §§ 346.63(l)(a) & 
346.65(2), STATS., and operating a motor vehicle 
with a prohibited alcohol concentration of .08% or 
more, see §§ 340.01(46m)(b), 346.63(l)(b) & 
346.65(2), STATS. He contends that the trial court 
erred in the following respects: (1) by not 
suppressing the results of the Intoxilyzer test that 
was given to him by the police; (2) by not accepting 
his offer to stipulate to his prior drunk-driving 
offenses, thereby permitting the jury to learn that he 
had already been twice convicted of drunk driving; 
(3) by refusing to give to the jury his "theory-of-
defense" instruction; and (4) by not ruling that his 
prosecution was barred by the double-jeopardy 
clause of the Fifth Amendment as a result of the 
prior administrative suspension of his driver's 
license. We affirm. 
1. The Intoxilyzer test. 
Following Alexander's arrest for drunk driving, 
police gave him a breath test using a machine that 
Alexander contends was not properly certified. 
Therefore, he argues, the trial court should not have 
admitted the results of that test. 
WIS. ADM.CODE § TRANS. 311.04 provides: 
Approval of breath alcohol test instruments. (1) 
Only instruments and ancillary equipment 
approved by the chief of the chemical test section 
may be used for the qualitative or quantitative 
analysis of alcohol in the breath. 
(2) (a) All models of breath testing instruments and 
ancillary equipment used shall be evaluated by the 
chief of the chemical test section. 
(b) The procedure for evaluation shall be 
determined by the chief of the chemical test 
section. 
(3) Each type or category of instrument shall be 
approved by the chief of the chemical test section 
prior to use in this state. 
The police used an Intoxilyzer 5000 for Alexander's 
breath test. Prior to this test, however, a new 
processor board was installed. The new board had a 
different model number than the one it replaced. At 
a hearing on Alexander's motion to suppress the 
breath-test results, George Menart, a senior 
electronics technician with the Wisconsin State 
Patrol, testified without contradiction that there was 
no difference between the machine with the old 
processor board and the machine with the new board 
insofar as "the basic analysis" of a subject's breath 
was concerned. Therefore, he testified, the 
Department of Transportation did not evaluate the 
Intoxilyzer machine with the new processor board 
because it had already evaluated the machine with 
the old board. 
Alexander moved to suppress the Intoxilyzer 
results, claiming that WIS. ADM.CODE § TRANS. 
311.04 was violated. The trial court denied 
Alexander's suppression motion, finding that there 
was "no difference in how the machine operates" 
with the new replacement board so that the machine 
with the new processor board was "the same" for 
breath-test purposes as it was with the old board. 
*2 Admissibility of evidence is governed by RULE 
901.04, STATS. [FN1] Both parties tacidy treated 
the admissibility of the results of Alexander's breath 
test as one to be decided under RULE 901.04(1), 
rather than as one of conditional relevancy under 
RULE 901.04(2); neither side asked the trial court 
to have the jury make the ultimate determination of 
whether the machines had passed muster under the 
regulation. The trial court's finding that there were 
no material differences between the machine that 
had gone through the evaluation process required by 
WIS. ADM.CODE § TRANS. 311.04 and the 
machine after the new board was installed was based 
on evidence that was not controverted. 
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Accordingly, its conclusion that § TRANS. 311.04 
had been complied with, and its decision to admit 
the results of the breath test were proper. [FN2] 
2. Alexander's proffered stipulation. 
No person who "has 2 or more prior convictions, 
suspensions or revocations" for drunk driving "as 
counted under s. 343.307(1)" may drive a motor 
vehicle in Wisconsin if he or she has "a blood 
alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more." Sections 
340.01(46m)(b) & 346.63(l)(b), STATS. These 
"prior convictions, suspensions or revocations" 
constitute "an element of the offense." State v. 
Ludeking, 195 Wis.2d 132, 136, 536 N.W.2d 392, 
396 (Ct.App.1995). Alexander offered to stipulate 
to his drunk-driving record, and moved to bar the 
State from introducing evidence of those prior 
convictions. The trial court denied the motion. 
This was error. See State v. McAllister, 153 
Wis.2d 523, 525, 529, 451 N.W.2d 764, 765, 767 
(Ct.App.1989) (where defendant's prior felony 
conviction is element of crime, defendant's offer to 
stipulate to the prior felony makes nature of felony 
not relevant unless it is being offered for some 
purpose other than to establish the felony-conviction 
element). We conclude, however, that the error 
was harmless. See id., 153 Wis.2d at 530, 451 
N.W.2d at 769 (improper admission of evidence in 
face of defendant's offer to stipulate subject to 
harmless-error analysis); see State v. Dyess, 124 
Wis.2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222, 233 (1985) 
(reversal of conviction not warranted unless there is 
reasonable possibility that error contributed to 
conviction). 
Alexander's status as a two-time convicted drunk 
driver made it illegal for him to drive if his blood-
alcohol concentration exceeded .08%. See §§ 
340.01(46m)(b) and 346.63(l)(b), STATS. The 
Intoxilyzer test of Alexander's breath indicated a 
blood-alcohol concentration of .24%-three times the 
legal limit. Moreover, the trial court instructed the 
jury that evidence of Alexander's two prior drunk-
driving convictions was being received because that 
evidence "bears upon the second element that the 
State must prove for the offense of driving with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration," that the jury was 
not to use the evidence "for any other purpose," and 
that the evidence was "not proof of guilt of the 
offense charged in this case." It is presumed that 
juries comply with the trial court's instructions. 
State v. Truax, 151 Wis.2d 354, 362, 444 N.W.2d 
432, 436 (Ct.App.1989). [FN3] There is no 
reasonable possibility that the trial court's error in 
not following McAllister contributed to Alexander's 
convictions in this case. 
3. Theory-of-defense instruction. 
•3 Alexander complains that the trial court did not 
give a special theory- of-defense instruction. 
Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred by 
not telling the jury that Alexander's theory-of-
defense was: (1) that he did not drink enough 
alcohol "to render him incapable of safely driving"; 
and (2) that the Intoxilyzer did not accurately 
measure Alexander's blood-alcohol concentration 
because it might have measured "residual mouth 
alcohol as opposed to deep lung alcohol," and 
because the machine's "maintenance history raises 
serious doubts about its reliability and accuracy." 
A "trial court has wide discretion in choosing the 
language of jury instructions and if the instructions 
given adequately explain the law applicable to the 
facts, that is sufficient and there is no error in the 
trial court's refusal to use the specific language 
requested by the defendant." State v. Herriges, 155 
Wis.2d 297, 300, 455 N.W.2d 635, 637 
(Ct.App.1990). Although a trial court must provide 
legal framework for a defendant's arguments that 
are supported by the evidence, it need not iterate for 
the jury a defendant's contentions. State v. 
Davidson, 44 Wis.2d 177, 191-192, 170 N.W.2d 
755, 763 (1969). Alexander does not claim that he 
was precluded by the trial court from arguing his 
contentions to the jury or that the jury was not 
otherwise accurately instructed on the applicable 
law. Accordingly, his complaint that the trial court 
erred is without merit. See id., 44 Wis.2d at 192, 
170 N.W.2d at 763. 
4. Double jeopardy. 
Both Alexander and the State recognize that State v. 
McMaster, 198 Wis.2d 542, 543 N.W.2d 499 
(Ct.App.1995), review granted, — Wis.2d — , 546 
N.W.2d 468 (1996), which held that an 
administrative suspension of a driver's operating 
license did not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution 
based on the same conduct, is dispositive. 
Accordingly, no analysis here is required or 
permitted. See In re Court of Appeals of 
Copr. O West 1997 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works 
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Wisconsin, 82 Wis.2d 369, 371, 263 N.W.2d 149, 
149-150 (1978) (per curiam ) (a published decision 
by one district of the court of appeals is binding on 
the court of appeals). 
By the Court.-Judgment affirmed. 
This opinion will not be published. See RULE 
809.23(l)(b)4, STATS. 
FN1. RULE 901.04, STATS., provides in material 
part: 
Preliminary questions. (1) QUESTIONS OF 
ADMISSIBILITY GENERALLY. Preliminary 
questions concerning the qualification of a person to 
be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the 
judge, subject to sub. (2) and ss. 971.31(11) and 
972.11(2). In making the determination the judge is 
bound by the rules of evidence only with respect to 
privileges and as provided in s. 901.05. 
(2) RELEVANCY CONDITIONED ON FACT. 
Page 3 
When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the 
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the judge shall 
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of 
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the 
fulfillment of the condition. 
FN2. We do not, therefore, decide whether 
suppression would have been an appropriate remedy 
if the Intoxilyzer machine had not passed the 
evaluation process required by WIS. ADM.CODE § 
TRANS. 311.04. See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 
296, 300, 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938) (only 
dispositive issue need be addressed). 
FN3. This is a "pragmatic" rule, and is "rooted less 
in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true 
than in the belief that it represents a reasonable 
practical accommodation of the interests of the state 
and the defendant." Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 
200,211 (1987). 
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